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Preface
1. Derek Bok, "Reclaiming the Public Trust," Change, July/August 1992,
pp. 13-9.
Chapter 1
1. President of Princeton University; Shapiro (1993, p. 12).
2. U.S. Department of Education (1992, Table 31, p. 34). These costs re-
fer to the explicit, out-of-pocket expenditures for higher education. They
do not measure the significant implicit component of costs in the form of
forgone earnings by students.
3. The educational and general category excludes expenditures on con-
struction, auxiliaries, and sponsored research. Inflation is measured by in-
creases in the GDP price deflator.
4. Between 1978/79 and 1987/88, Getz and Siegfried found that educa-
tional and general spending per FTE student in all institutions of higher
education rose 2.7 percent per year faster than the overall rate of inflation.
The comparable rate for all private institutions was 4.0 percent; for private
research universities without medical schools, 4.1 percent; for private re-
search universities with medical schools, 3.9 percent; for private liberal arts
colleges with enrollments of less than 1,000 students, 4.3 percent; and for
private liberal arts colleges with enrollments of more than 1,000 students,
4.8 percent (Getz and Siegfried 1991, pp. 380, 382).
5. The discount, calculated here as the ratio of scholarships and fellow-
ships financed out of unrestricted funds to all tuition and fee revenues, in-
creased for all private institutions from 8.7 percent in 1975/76 to 15.3 per-
cent in 1991/92, and from 7.9 to 8.7 percent over the same period for public
institutions (Clotfelter 1991, p. 71; and U.S. Office of Education 1994, Ta-
bles 317-8 and 327-8). Because the net cost is the product of stated tuition
and the net price (one minus the discount percentage), the growth of net
tuition is the difference between the growth rates of stated tuition and the
net price. For example, the net price of private college fell from 0.913 to
0.847 between 1975/76 and 1991/92, for a growth rate of -0.0047, or -0.5
percent.
6. From 1975 to 1992, the annual rate of increase in all prices (Consumer
Price Index) was 5.6 percent; for medical costs, it was 7.6 percent (U.S.
Council of Economic Advisers 1994, p. 335). At private universities, the rate
of increase for the period 1975/76 to 1991/92 for tuition, room, and board
at private universities was 8.6 percent (U.S. Department of Education 1992,
p. 308). The financial aid discount for private institutions rose from 8.7266 NOTES TO PAGES 4-13
percent in 1975/76 to 15.3 percent in 1991/92, for an annual growth rate of
— 0.5 percent over this 16-year period (U.S. Department of Education 1989,
Tables 270 and 280). Applying this rate to the 8.6 percent rate in stated
tuition rates yields a growth in net tuition of 8.1 percent.
7. See Cook and Frank (1993) for an analysis of the concentration of top
students in these institutions. To indicate their relative size, the authors note
that the 33 colleges and universities designated by the Barron's guide as
"most competitive" enrolled just 2.4 percent of the seniors who took the
Scholastic Aptitude Test in 1980 (p. 127).
8. Edward R. Fiske, New York Times, May 12, 1987.
9. "Colleges: A Machine with No Brakes," Washington Post Weekly, August
21-27, 1989; Washington Post, January 28, 1993.
10. "Time to Prune the Ivy," Business Week, May 24, 1993, pp. 112-8. For
similar attacks on the growth of administration in universities, see Berg-
mann (1991) or Wagner and Bowermaster (1992).
11. Gene I. Maeroff, "College Teachers, the New Leisure Class," Wall
Street Journal, September 13, 1993, sec. A; and Sykes (1988, p. 5).
12. Sowell (1993, p. 13).
13. See, for example, Gary Putka, "Tracking Tuition: Why College Fees
Are Rising so Sharply," Wall Street Journal, December 11, 1987, or Business
Week, May 24, 1993.
14. William Bennett, "Our Greedy Colleges," New York Times, February 18,
1987, sec. A. Similar themes are raised by another member of the Reagan
administration, Chester Finn. See Finn (1984).
15. Representative Wyden's comment expressed the indignation with
which the committee greeted these revelations and Kennedy's apparently
unrepentant attitude: "I think that this is a very sad day for one of the
world's great universities. Speaking both as a Stanford graduate, as a tax-
payer, I never thought that one would see this day where the president of
Stanford University was going to be sitting where you are and asked to ex-
plain why antique fruitwood commodes were billed to the taxpayer. . . ."
U.S. House of Representatives (1991, p. 193).
16. Among the initial stories on the investigation was Barbara Vobejda's,
"Antitrust Probe Targets College Tuition Aid," Washington Post, August 9,
1989, sec. A.
17. See, for example, Davidson Goldin, "Full-Tuition Students Increas-
ingly Pay for Others," New York Times, March 22, 1995, sec. A, or Fred M.
Hechinger, "About Education," New York Times, April 25, 1990, sec. B.
18. See, for example, Kennedy (1985) or Joseph Berger, "College Officials
Defend Sharply Rising Tuition," New York Times, March 23, 1988, sec. B.
19. For a bibliography relevant to the economic impact of both university
and corporate research, see Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1992).
20. For a comparison to Japan, see Clotfelter et al. (1991, p. 12).
21. See, for example, Clotfelter (1991, p. 89).
22. For a discussion of explanations for increasing costs in higher educa-
tion, see chapter 2.
23. To be sure, some variation exists even among the most selective insti-NOTES TO PAGES 13-25 267
tutions in the application of this dual commitment, with some institutions
offering "merit" scholarships or athletic scholarships in addition to need-
based aid. For the purposes at hand, it seems most useful to group together
those institutions that make this commitment, regardless of whether they
also offer other forms of aid.
24. Sowell (1992, p. 26) states, "colleges and universities use the same
methods as business cartels or monopolies. Like monopolistic price discrimi-
nators in the commercial world, private colleges and universities set an unre-
alistically high list price and then offer varying discounts. In academia, this
list price is called tuition and the discount is called 'financial aid.'" For a
contrary view, however, see Bowen and Breneman (1993).
25. The Higher Education General Information Survey and its successor,
the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, both undertaken and
maintained by the U.S. Department of Education, have been the standard
data sets for empirical analysis of higher education. See Getz and Siegfried
(1991, ch. 11) for a description of these surveys.
26. The Carnegie scheme of classification divides colleges and universities
into six major types: (1) research universities, (2) doctoral-granting univer-
sities, (3) comprehensive universities, (4) liberal arts colleges, (5) two-year
institutions, and (6) specialized institutions. For a short description of this
classification scheme, see Clotfelter et al. 1991, Table 2.
27. Getz and Siegfried (1991), for example, divide research universities in
this way in their analysis.
28. See Getz and Siegfried (1991, pp. 271-85) and Halstead (n.d.).
29. The growth rates calculated in the present study are exponential
growth rates, corresponding to instantaneous compounding. Where Xo is a
beginning quantity and Xi is a comparable quantity after t years, the aver-
age annual growth rate is g in the equation:
X, = Xo **.
Chapter 2
1. Clark (1987, p. 264).
2. In the parlance currently in use in the theory and application of busi-
ness "reengineering," activities such as those described here often are char-
acterized as business "processes," which refer to functions of a business that
may or may not correspond to existing organizational divisions within the
business. See, for example, Davenport (1993).
3. See, for example, Keohane (1993, p. 114) or Stigler (1993, p. 175).
4. Carleton College, Academic Catalog 1993-94, p. 3.
5. Surveys of faculty indicate a marked increase in the perceived impor-
tance of research in obtaining tenure. The percentage of all faculty who
strongly agreed with the statement, "In my department it is difficult for a
person to achieve tenure if he or she does not publish," increased from 21 to
42 percent between 1969 and 1989. Among faculty in research universities,
the percentage strongly agreeing rose from 44 to 83 percent (Boyer 1990, p.
12).268 NOTES TO PAGES 26-33
6. Caplow and McGee (1958, p. 221) note the irony of the situation: "It is
only a slight exaggeration to say that academic success is likely to come to
the man who has learned to neglect his assigned duties in order to have
more time and energy to pursue his private professional interests."
7. Cole (1993 p. 6).
8. The view of Sykes (1988, p. 7) is at one extreme: "Professors, after all,
control everything that matters in the universities."
9. Quoted in Clark (1987, p. 156). In assessing their role in governance,
Clark (p. 264) states that faculty in the research university:
[D]evelop a strong sense of nationhood in their own department, ruling it by
collective decision making and holding administrators at arm's length from the
core tasks. Since trustees have ultimate authority and make occasional large deci-
sions, and since the administrative staff steadily elaborates bureaucratic controls,
the setting is far from innocent of contrary forces. But the greater power lies in
subjects, the stuff of academic work itself.
10. Arnold R. Weber (1989), then president of Northwestern University,
remarked, "A few imaginative college administrators have raised prices
above competitive levels to try to persuade consumers that a higher price
indicates a higher-quality product." For another expression of this idea, see
Noah (1983, p. 18).
11. See McPherson and Winston (1993b). The study by Spies (1978) of
admissions trends at selective colleges and universities provides empirical
support for this argument. He observes, "[A]n institution faced with the
choices of increasing tuition or damaging its academic reputation by cutting
back programs might do more to discourage applications if it followed the
latter course" (p. 17). As noted in chapter 3 of this book, at least some insti-
tutions appeared to believe that raising tuition would not necessarily hurt
their admissions outcomes.
12. See McPherson and Winston (1993b, pp. 69—105) for a discussion of
this issue.
13. See, for example, Massy and Wilger (1992, p. 370).
14. I believe this wish to make a difference is one of the central reasons
for the existence of endowments, an issue that has been discussed at length
by Hansmann (1990). Endowments are stocks of financial assets generating
spendable revenue, most of which are designated for named funds that are
restricted to specified uses. To me, the wishes of the donor to have recogni-
tion, to make a difference—and to do both in perpetuity—and the ame-
nability of the tax law in making virtually all such gifts, in life or after death,
fully deductible, explain the prevalence of this form of giving.
15. For a discussion of their calculations, see the appendix to this chapter.
16. In the view of some observers, studies examining per-student costs are
inherently flawed, in that they may be interpreted as taking constant returns
to scale (that is, constant per-student costs) to be the norm. Moreover, if
enrollments were to fall very rapidly, these costs almost certainly would in-
crease, owing to the stickiness of many expenditures. To interpret such in-
creases as increases in cost would be misleading, according to this view.NOTES TO PAGES 34-47 269
17. The Higher Education Price Index (HEPI) gives more than one-half
of its weight to professional salaries and more than four-fifths to compensa-
tion of all kinds (Halstead 1983, p. 52). Between 1976/77 and 1989/90, the
HEPI increased by 128 percent, whereas the Consumer Price Index rose by
116 percent (U.S. Department of Education 1992, p. 41, Table 38).
18. Massy and Wilger (1992, p. 366) cite this effect.
19. See also Shapiro (1993, p. 13) or Bowen (1992, p. 175).
20. See, for example, Meisinger and Dubeck (1984, pp. 16—9), Getz and
Siegfried (1991, p. 266), or Massy and Wilger (1992, p. 365).
21. Massy (1990, p. 3) defines growth force as the "constant pressure to
layer new courses, programs, and disciplines on old ones, to increase the
specialization and hence the size of the faculty. . . ." Bergmann (1991), in
contrast, focuses on growth in administrative areas, ascribing it to "the de-
sire of each administrator for more underlings" and the absence of effective
curbs on administrative growth. See also Getz and Siegfried (1991, p. 266).
22. Bowen (1968) discusses the importance of revenues in a slightly differ-
ent way in his analysis of rising expenditures by private universities: "[T]he
level of expenditures depends to a considerable extent on the amount of
income available—just as the amount of income available depends to a con-
siderable extent on the strength of the pressures for increased expenditures.
The interdependence of the expenditure and income sides of the budget is
a basic characteristic of all non-profit organizations. ..."
23. For general statements of this widely cited hypothesis, see, for exam-
ple, Baumol and Bowen (1966) or Baumol (1967). Bowen (1968, pp. 12-6)
applies the thesis directly to private universities and to the increase in their
expenditures during the 1950s and 1960s.
24. See also Cole (1993), who argues that administrators embraced and
pushed the emphasis on research during the 1980s, and Massy and Wilger
(1992, pp. 367—8), who refer to the increased emphasis on research as "out-
put creep."
25. See, for example, Niskanen (1971).
26. See also Breneman (1994, p. 106) for a reference to logrolling in de-
termining college budgets.
27. He states (p. 39): "Lacking the power to make changes without painful
confrontation and lacking the personal incentive to overcome that obstacle,
administrators are likely to prefer the status quo and to avoid initiatives that
would make their institution different from others."
28. See, for example, Kennedy (1993, p. 139).
29. For a summary of these admissions indicators for 1991/92, see Table
3.2.
30. Petersons Guide to Four-Year Colleges 1994 (Princeton, NJ: Peterson's
Guides, 1994).
31. Address to the Board of Trustees, September 28, 1984.
32. Graduate students in education were counted with professional stu-
dents, although Duke had no separate school of education. The number of
education graduate students was large, constituting about one-fifth of the
graduate school's enrollment in 1976.270 NOTES TO PAGES 48-59
33. This committee, the Administrative Planning Committee, was com-
posed of four faculty members, three administrators, and three students.
34. Minutes of the Administrative Policy Committee, January 25, 1984.
35. This relationship is discussed at greater length in the remainder of
this appendix.
36. The assumption in the model that direct costs are fully covered may
not be correct. One practice that apparently became more common during
the 1980s was for granting agencies to insist that institutions contribute
matching funds for certain research-related expenditures. Furthermore, di-
rect costs might not be covered fully if the depreciation schedules used for
scientific machinery tend to overstate useful lives or if grants end before the
useful lives of this equipment have ended.
37. Although Figure 2.1 may be viewed as a picture of cross-subsidy, it
remains impossible to pick any point of demarcation showing whether re-
search subsidizes instruction or vice-versa. To say, for example, that at levels
below D* instruction is subsidizing research implicitly would assume that
donors and students have no interest in research; to the extent that they do,
one would expect the net costs of research to be positive. This may be what
Kennedy (1993, p. 148) has in mind when he refers to the growth in re-
stricted expenditures as taxing the general fund.
38. Two empirical studies of institutional response are those by McPher-
son and Schapiro (1991) and by Ehrenberg, Rees, and Brewer (1993).
39. Where the growth in X over t years can be described by the exponen-
tial function Xi — Xo e
n, then the growth rate of any product is r(bc) = r(b)
+ r(c), and the growth rate of any quotient is r(blc) = r(b) — r(c).
Chapter 3
1. Farewell Address to the Nation, January 11, 1989 (Reagan 1989, pp.
412-3).
2. For a discussion of the components of this increase, see Clotfelter et al.
(1991, chap. 1).
3. The rise in applications is reflected in an annual survey of freshmen.
Among those attending private universities, the percentage who applied to
as many as seven institutions increased from 12.1 percent in 1979 to 22.5
percent in 1992 (Astin, 1979, 1992), tables entitled, "Weighted National
Norms for All Freshmen." For a description of the increase in applications
to the most selective institutions, see Deirdre Carmondy, "Better Students
Finding Colleges Reject Them," New York Times, April 20, 1988, sec. B.
4. Calculations are based on data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current
Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 184, Money Income of Households, Families,
and Persons in the United States: 1992 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1993), Table B-7. See Table 3A.1 in the appendix to this chapter.
5. These rates applied to ordinary, as opposed to capital gains, income
and do not reflect the 33 percent marginal tax rate "bubble" applying to one
band of income classes.NOTES TO PAGES 60-69 271
6. According to one set of tabulations, the effective tax rate for the top 20
percent of households fell from 27.2 percent in 1977 to 26.4 percent in
1989 (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1992
Green Book, p. 1510, Table 14). Similarly, Kasten, Sammartino, and Toder
(1992, Table 12) estimate that the average federal tax rate on the top one-
fifth of households declined over the period 1980 to 1989.
7. Between 1981 and 1988, median sales prices increased by 50 percent in
Washington, DC, 73 percent in San Francisco, 126 percent in Boston, and
150 percent in the New York metropolitan area (Phillips 1990, Appendix
1-2). See also Richard W. Stevenson, "Housing Prices Expected To Be Slug-
gish in the 90's," New York Times, April 6, 1990, sec. A.
8. U.S Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No.
118, Money Income in 1977 of Families and Persons in the United States (Washing-
ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), Table 22; and Money Income of
Households, Families, and Persons in the United States: 1992 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1993), Table 9. Using the Gross Domestic
Product price deflator, the dollar value in 1977 corresponding to $65,000 in
1992 was $30,004. The estimate of average family size for families with in-
comes of $30,004 or more in 1977 was computed using interpolation. Cook
and Frank (1993, p. 133) also make this point.
9. For evidence, see, for example, Clotfelter (1991, p. 46, Table 2.13) or
Hearn (1990).
10. See Freeman (1976). For further discussion of the return to college
education, see Clotfelter (1991, pp. 64-9).
11. The exact timing of the trough in the earnings advantage depends on
the measure used. One time series presented in Clotfelter et al. (1991, p. 66,
Figure 3.1) suggests 1980 for men. For further discussion of the economic
returns from college, see also Murphy and Welch (1989).
12. Minutes of the Administrative Policy Committee, Carleton College,
May 8, 1986.
13. For analyses of the academic labor market and salaries, see Hansen
(1986) or Ehrenberg (1991).
14. Calculations are based on data in The Lawyer's Almanac, various years
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Law and Business), and American
Medical Association, Socioeconomic Characteristics of Medical Practice, 1987
through 1994 editions. Data on starting salaries, comparing three doctoral
fields with MBAs and lawyers, similarly show that increases in academic sal-
aries were well within the range of those in other professions (Ehrenberg
1991, p. 182, Table 8.3).
15. For a description of the methodology for computing the Higher Edu-
cation Price Index, see Halstead (1983).
16. A monopsonist is a firm that is the only buyer in a factor market. See
Ransom (1993) for an application of the monopsony model to the market
for faculty.
17. Conversation with Irwin Feller, November 17, 1994. Similarly, Ken-
nedy (1985) argues that there has been a general decline in the federal gov-272 NOTES TO PAGES 69-83
ernment's commitment to pay for scientific equipment and cites attempts by
the National Institutes of Health to reduce research support by withholding
a portion of indirect costs.
18. That reimbursements systematically fail to cover costs is suggested, for
example, by Richardson (1992, p. 182) and Rosovsky (1992, p. 184).
19. Institutions themselves made up for some of the declines in federal
student aid grants. See, for example, Clotfelter et al. (1991, p. 105).
20. For a discussion of this econometric work, see Clotfelter et al. (1991,
pp. 107-13).
21. A listing for 1987/88, for example, showed 9 national universities,
including such universities as Harvard and Chicago, with an average tuition
and fees of $16,767; 9 national colleges other than Carleton, including such
colleges as Wellesley and Oberlin, with an average of $15,658; and 10 Mid-
western colleges other than Carleton, including such colleges as Grinnell
and St. Olaf, with an average of $12,192. Carleton's figure for that year was
$13,640, the highest of the its group, $3,100 below the average for the na-
tional universities, and $2,000 below that of the national colleges.
22 The minutes of the Administrative Policy Committee, February 28,
1978, made specific reference to the empirical study by Spies (1978): "Citing
passages from a COFHE report entitled 'The Effect of Rising Costs on Col-
lege Choice' to support his point, Mr. Sullivan urged that since it has been
demonstrated that students in the market for a school like Carleton are less
influenced in their choice by the cost than by the academic quality of the
institution, we should not hold down Carleton's comprehensive fee at the
risk of lowering its quality." At a meeting a decade later, committee mem-
bers heard a report on research indicating that some students, particularly
those from the East, were likely to equate price with quality (Minutes, April
3, 1989).
23. Minutes of the Administrative Policy Committee, Carleton College,
May 13, 1980.
24. He also noted that this would be a good time for an increase because
of favorable press that Carleton had received in an article in U.S. News and
World Report (Minutes of the Administrative Policy Committee, Carleton Col-
lege, February 1, 1988).
25. Minutes of the Administrative Policy Committee, Carleton College,
April 3, 1989.
26. For evidence that selective colleges and universities enroll a dispropor-
tionate share of students from affluent families, see McPherson and Winston
(1993a, chap. 5).
27. Hauptman (1990, pp. 80, 82) makes a similar argument, emphasizing
the ability of institutions to raise tuitions and their wish to enhance their
academic and student service offerings.
Chapter 4
1. Bowen (1980, p. 15).
2. Defining a cost function is more difficult even than assigning costs,NOTES TO PAGES 83-87 273
because it requires a measure of the firm's output. In the case of higher
education, it is the unfortunate fact that we cannot adequately describe, let
alone measure, the output. Higher education produces many different out-
puts, and we have only a vague idea of the "technology" involved. (Although
it is generally believed, for example, that teaching a seminar is different
from teaching a lecture, and that student time and effort are vital inputs in
the process, our understanding of these differences is rudimentary.)
3. It is worth noting one inherent difficulty in the omission of medical
schools and centers. To varying degrees, most major university medical cen-
ters contain faculty whose work would be judged as "basic," as opposed to
applied research, in such fields as genetics and microbiology. Although such
fields could be classified in arts and sciences, the approach taken here is to
omit such departments when they are part of the university's medical center.
4. University accounting systems typically place all fringe benefits in the
same account. In order to estimate the fringe benefits applying to each cate-
gory of employee, the appropriate fringe benefit rate for the year and class
of worker was added to salaries and deducted from total fringe benefits. To
the extent that this method did not exhaust the fringe benefit totals pre-
cisely, the difference was reflected in the residual category.
5. For example, annual capital outlays for the University of Chicago were
available for the years 1983/84 to 1992/93. These expenditures were divided
by departmental group and converted into constant 1991/92 dollars. Aver-
ages then were formed: for 1983/84, the average of capital spending in
1983/84 and 1984/85; for 1986/87, the average of 1985/86, 1986/87, and
1987/88; and for 1991/92, the average of 1990/91, 1991/92, and 1992/93.
6. The departmental groups include four sets of academic departments (hu-
manities, social sciences, natural sciences, and engineering), library, student
services, plant, admissions and financial aid, arts and sciences administra-
tion, provost, alumni affairs and development, and other general admin-
istration. A 13th department, athletics, is shown separately. The expendi-
ture types are as follows: compensation for regular faculty, other faculty,
administrative staff, nonexempt workers, and students; professional ser-
vices; contract work; computers; financial aid (including stipends for gradu-
ate students); supplies; general operating expenses; capital expenditures;
maintenance; and a residual, which includes excess or insufficient fringe
benefits. For a detailed listing of departmental components and spending
categories used to create the table, see appendix Table 4A.2.
7. The specific proportions used for Duke were: 90 percent of the library,
95 percent of student services and alumni affairs and development, 75 per-
cent of the provost's office, and 20 percent of plant and general administra-
tion. All other categories were assigned exclusively to arts and sciences and
engineering. These percentages reflect administrators' estimates. The 20
percent figure for general administration reflects the large number of build-
ings, employees, and financial transactions in the university's medical center.
By comparison, the percentages of departmental groups assigned to arts
and sciences at the University of Chicago were: 60 percent of the library, 53
percent of the provost, and 80 percent each of student services, plant, and274 NOTES TO PAGES 87-119
general administration. All other categories were assigned to arts and sci-
ences entirely. The first of the above estimates for Chicago was based on the
proportion of students in arts and sciences and the second on the propor-
tion of faculty. The 80 percent figure was an estimate made by administra-
tors in the budget office.
8. The interested reader can verify this assertion by applying alternative
allocation percentages to the tabular data given in this chapter.
9. As noted in the appendix, however, the inclusion of transfers combined
with the apportioning of nonallocatable general expenditures means that
internal transfers do not necessarily cancel out completely.
10. During this period, the way in which payments to graduate students
were allocated between fellowships and salaries for teaching changed signifi-
cantly. For this reason, most categories covering salaries to graduate stu-
dents are included in the category of fellowship spending.
11. For the purpose of computing full compensation, wages and salaries
in each category were multiplied by the applicable fringe benefit rate, and
the resulting amount was transferred from the separate fringe benefit ac-
count to the appropriate compensation category. These calculated fringe
benefits did not equal exactly the totals in the university's fringe benefit
accounts; the residual category shown in the table consists almost entirely of
the difference.
12. As noted in the text, the use of the eight-year period 1983/84 through
1991/92 was necessitated by the lack of computer-readable accounting data
before 1983/84. As a check on the validity of relying on this shortened pe-
riod in the analysis of expenditure trends, a comparison using data for Duke
was made, using other data between the period 1976/77 to 1983/84 and the
more recent period covered in the tables. This comparison is presented in
appendix 4.3.
13. Where Xi and X2 are expenditures for one category in years 1 and 2,
respectively, and T2 is total expenditure in year 2, the percentage increase in
total spending attributable to increased expenditures for category X is
(X2-Xl)/T2 = (X2/r2)((X2-X1)/X2), or the product of the category's share of the total and the percentage growth in that category.
14. The large change in the federal share for admissions/financial aid and
arts and sciences administration is due apparently to a change in the unit to
which ROTC scholarships were assigned.
15. For the Harvard tables, the General Academic group includes the
Core Curriculum, Freshman and House Seminars, and General Education;
Natural Sciences includes departments 44, 49, 52, and 66; and Plant in-
cludes Physical Resources and Grounds and Buildings.
16. As noted in Table 4A.3, faculty compensation refers to Harvard's
classes 01 (tenured professors) and 02 (faculty on term appointments longer
than one year, mostly associate and assistant professors). Class 01 also in-
cludes some administrators who were grandfathered into that classification
by virtue of being in their jobs in 1976, when administrators first were in-
cluded in class 03.
17. See the appendix for a brief discussion of internal transfers and re-
charges.NOTES TO PAGES 121-147 275
18. Where to classify history has been a subject of debate for some time.
See, for example, Sills (1968, p. xxi).
19. Further use is made of fund codes in the next chapter.
20. The departmental group into which any expenditure item was classi-
fied in the detailed analysis of financial data was determined by the "primary
component," usually the unit responsible for the expenditure.
21. These amounts may differ for several reasons. First, the "unrestricted"
expenditures taken from the detailed financial data include "allocated" ex-
penditures, which were spent out of special fund codes, using money that
might have been taken out of previous years' unrestricted budgets. The pay-
ments into these allocated fund codes were not counted in the detailed anal-
ysis; only the expenditures out of them were counted. However, the fund
codes examined included no accounts for such allocated expenditures.
22. As is shown in chapter 6, because the staff size of the counsel's office
grew modestly over the period, this increase in spending by the university
counsel appears to be the result of hiring of outside counsel.
Chapter 5
1. President, University of Chicago. Gray (1992, p. 235).
2. For data on broader averages of faculty salaries, see Table 5A. 1 in the
appendix to this chapter.
3. In a steady state, in which the number of professors retiring and being
replaced is constant, the difference would depend on the average growth in
real salaries for continuing faculty and the average length of service from
promotion to full professor to retirement. In actual institutions, the differ-
ence also would depend on the age distribution of the faculty.
4. Report of the Faculty Compensation Committee to the Executive Com-
mittee of the Academic Council, "Additional Information on Faculty Sal-
aries," March 8, 1993.
5. It seems likely that some portion of the increase in the calculated fringe
benefit rate for Duke overstates the actual increase. At least one category,
benefits administration, reflects costs that were incurred in previous years
but that, apparently, were noted only in the most recent years for the pur-
pose of indirect cost recovery.
6. Exponential growth rate for 15 years of 1.1528 to 1.2269.
7. For a discussion of journal price inflation, see Noll and Steinmueller
(1992).
8. Between 1981/82 and 1991/92, a period in which prices overall in-
creased by 47 percent, the increases in the following components of the
Higher Education Price Index were: professional salaries, 72 percent; non-
professional salaries, 49 percent; library acquisitions, 99 percent; supplies
and materials, 18 percent; services, 53 percent; construction, 39 percent;
and capital equipment, 36 percent.
9. See, for example, Bowen and Rudenstine (1992, chap. 10).
10. As explained in chapter 4, each of the lines of the expenditure tables
for Duke and Chicago has been multiplied by a constant that approximates
the arts and sciences share of each departmental group. In the case of arts276 NOTES TO PAGES 147-153
and sciences academic departments and arts and sciences administration, in
addition to all the lines at Harvard and Carleton, this constant is 100 per-
cent, since these units were by definition wholly in arts and sciences.
11. For each of 10 expenditure categories, price indices P\ from Research
Associates of Washington (1994) were used to calculate changes in factor
market prices. The increased spending in any category attributable to the
increase in prices of that category is £liIi(P2i
/'Pii)~^ii> where I\ is the gen-
eral price level in period 1 relative to 1991/92 and E\\ is expenditures for
that category in the base year, in 1991/92 dollars. The categories are: profes-
sional salaries, nonprofessional salaries, library acquisitions, supplies and
materials, services, capital (the average of the construction and capital
equipment indices), and faculty salaries. The index of faculty compensa-
tion at the universities was based on a weighted average of full, associate,
and assistant professor salaries plus fringe benefits for private indepen-
dent doctoral institutions (category I) from the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) annual survey (Academe 1982, p. 18; 1984,
p. 9; and 1992, pp. 19, 28). Data on private, independent, baccalaureate
colleges (category IIB) were used to make the comparable calculation for
Carleton.
12. Averages in Tables 5A.1 and 5A.2 reflect changes in the distribution
of faculty by rank, whereas the index used in the current chapter uses
weights of three ranks based on the relative number of faculty in those insti-
tutions in 1991/92.
13. Where C\ is first-period compensation for regular faculty, the portion
deemed attributable to growth in the size of the faculty is Ci(iV2/iV]) — C\,
where N refers to the faculty size in years 1 and 2, respectively.
14. Harvard figures are full-time-equivalents; figures for other institutions
are numbers of regular faculty.
15. Where S is average salary for the institution and S* is average salary
for the market, the over-market increase in salaries is given by (S2/S\ —
S*2/S*i) C\. Where/is the institution's fringe benefit rate and/* is the aver-
age for all institutions, the increase attributable to an extraordinary increase
in the fringe benefit rate is [(1 +/>)/( 1 +/i) - (1 +/2*)/(l +/i*)] Cx.
16. Where N is the number of graduate or undergraduate students, as
applicable, and A\ is the amount of aid awarded in period 1, the portion of
increased financial aid expenditure is Ax (N2/Ni) — A\. The portion attribut-
able to aid per student is the residual increase in financial aid, or A2 — A\
{N2INX).
17. For a description of the formula used in calculating need-based aid,
see Clotfelter (1991, pp. 95-8).
18. At Duke, the percentage of total arts and sciences spending devoted to
administration rose from about 38 to 41 percent; at Harvard, the increase
was from 30 to 34 percent.
19. Negative values in expenditure accounts ordinarily signify repayments
for services rendered. Thus, significant negative amounts as well as positive
amounts would indicate existence.
20. Calculation by Office of Dean of Arts and Sciences.NOTES TO PAGES 155-163 277
21. The four primary entities here are: (1) the Division of Applied Sci-
ences, (2) Organismal and Evolutionary Biology, (3) the Museum of Com-
parative Zoology, and (4) the Harvard Observatory.
22. The federal government's share of academic research and develop-
ment expenditures declined from 67 to 59 percent from 1980/81 to 1991/92
(Feller 1995, p. 7). Blasdell, McPherson, and Schapiro (1993, p. 29) show
that private universities experienced the same trend for the period 1979 to
1989.
23. For a discussion of the manifestations and effects of such cost-shifting,
see Feller (1995, pp. 16-20).
Chapter 6
1. Comment on Shapiro in Minerva 30 (summer 1992): 185.
2. "Here is a partial list of new undergraduate services provided at Har-
vard during the past decade: special advice and counselling for minority
students and personnel to work on race relations issues; special resources
for disabled students; additional public service programs; programs pertain-
ing to sexual harassment; expansion of office of career services; increased
security costs, i.e., shuttle buses, police, guards, escort services, improvement
in lighting; major increases in women's athletics and recreational sports; in-
creased staff for financial aid services; greater supervision of extracurricular
activities. There have also been major increases in services to graduate stu-
dents" (Rosovsky 1992, p. 185).
3. See, for example, Getz and Siegfried (1991, p. 263).
4. One of the most well-known pieces of federal regulation is Circular A—
21, which establishes the rules for determining reimbursement to univer-
sities for the indirect costs of research. One paragraph chosen at random,
C5 (b), suggests the degree of complexity that may be involved in compli-
ance with regulations: "In some instances, the amounts received from the
federal government to finance institutional activities or service operation
should be treated as applicable credits. Specifically, the concept of netting
such credit items against related expenditures should be applied by the insti-
tution in determining the rates or amounts to be charged to sponsored
agreements for services rendered whenever the facilities or other resources
used in providing such services have been financed directly, in whole or in
part, by federal funds. (See Sections F8 and J44 for areas of potential appli-
cation in the matter of direct federal financing.)" (U.S. Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, Office of Management and Budget Circular A—21—Cost Prin-
ciples for Educational Institutions, Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, November 1991, p. 3.)
5. They state (1992, p. 367): "Consensus management . . . has become the
norm for conducting business throughout higher education. Administrative
and academic support staff personnel are widely consulted on a variety of
issues. Agreements are hammered out before decisions are made. Although
this process has the merit of being broadly participatory, it has many draw-
backs." Among the drawbacks mentioned are the time required to reach278 NOTES TO PAGES 163-170
decisions and the lack of accountability. For a complementary interpretation
of the role of university administrators, see Feldstein (1993).
6. For inefficiency, or any cause, to cause costs to increase, it also must
increase; to raise the rate of cost increase, it must rise at a more rapid rate
than other components of the total. In the present discussion, in considera-
tion of the abstractness of the causes themselves, these distinctions are taken
for granted.
7. Economists distinguish two kinds of inefficiency. Allocative inefficiency is
the uneconomic use of resources. Allocative inefficiency may manifest itself,
for example, in a capital-labor ratio that makes it more expensive to produce
a given unit of output, or in an excessive amount of an output, which might
be higher education itself. A second kind, which probably corresponds more
closely to the common interpretation of the term, is what Leibenstein (1966)
termed x-inefficiency, the failure to employ whatever resources are used in
their best way. This type of inefficiency may show up as disorganization, old-
fashioned routines, or long coffee breaks.
8. For a study of innovation in higher education, including some of the
computing and communications equipment mentioned here, see Getz, Sieg-
fried, and Anderson (1994).
9. For ease of data collection, I chose a set of seven administrative compo-
nent codes rather than try to follow the changing set of codes corresponding
to the four administrative areas discussed here.
10. One estimate made around 1980 was that 40 percent of commercial
applications of computers had proven uneconomic, in the sense that the cost
to perform the same job had increased as a result of computerization (Kid-
der 1981, p. 244).
11. Committee to Study the Impact of Information Technology on the
Performance of Service Activities (1994, pp. 156—70). In explaining the lag
in the impact of new technology, this report states: "In many cases, knowl-
edge workers have used IT [information technology] to do more busy work
without necessarily enhancing output—spreadsheets can be recalculated,
presentations fine-tuned, or manuscripts revised more frequently with little
noticeable benefit" (p. 170). See also Sylvia Nasar, "90's May Be the Growth
Decade," New York Times, February 17, 1992, sec. C.
12. Shapiro (1992) suggests the proposition that productivity is directly
related to the speed with which information can be gathered and processed.
Of the innovations in higher education noted by Getz, Siegfried, and Ander-
son (1994), several have had dramatic effects on this speed, including on-
line databases, automated circulation and public catalogs in libraries, and
interbuilding data networks, not to mention personal computers.
13. At various times, other functions have been housed in the counsel's
office at Duke, including public affairs and patents. The first of these func-
tions was excluded from the present tabulations, and the second was in-
cluded in the area of sponsored research.
14. At Duke, the administrative units that existed during the period of
study in this area include the Office of Research Support, the Office of
Research and Development, the Office of Research Administration and Pol-NOTES TO PAGES 170-188 279
icy, the Patent Office, the Office of Technology Transfer, the Office of
Sponsored Programs, and the Office of Cost Accounting. At Harvard, they
include the Office for Sponsored Research and the Office for Technology
and Trademark Licensing.
15. The entities covered at Duke were counseling and psychological ser-
vices, plus all offices under student affairs with the exception of cultural
affairs, religious activities, university union, and the Mary Lou Williams
Center for Black Culture. Several parts of student affairs at the University
of Chicago were omitted from the tabulations in Table 6.6: registrar, gradu-
ate admissions and financial aid, resident halls, and physical education.
16. Also included at Duke were employee health fitness programs and
employee discrimination, the latter being covered by a special assistant to the
president for equal opportunity and the university ombudsman.
17. See note 2 above.
18. Data from Harvard were provided on a full-time-equivalent (FTE)
basis. In the case of Duke, the FTE basis was calculated by multiplying the
percentage of weeks of the year worked by the percentage of hours out of
40 typically worked.
19. See Table 4A.6 in chapter 4, appendix 4.3.
20. See Table 5.4 in chapter 5.
21. It is worth noting that information on nonregular faculty at univer-
sities tends to be of poor quality. One reason may be the highly individu-
alized arrangements that often accompany this kind of employment, rang-
ing from a lump payment for teaching one course to no payment whatever
for university administrators who teach occasional courses.
Chapter 7
1. "The Way We Live Now," Faculty Newsletter, Duke University 4 (October
1992).
2. Massy and Wilger (1992, p. 367) state: "While quantitative data to dem-
onstrate the ratchet are sparse, the discretionary time model developed by
Massy and Zemsky . . . shows that faculty do behave in ways that are consis-
tent with the concept."
3. By the 1903/04 academic year, Harvard's introductory lecture courses
had enrollments in the hundreds. Economics 1 had an enrollment of 529;
Geology 4, an enrollment of 489; and History 1, an enrollment of 408 (Vey-
sey 1965, p. 339a).
4. This simulation is described in more detail in appendix 7.1.
5. Minutes of the Administrative Policy Committee, Carleton College. See,
for example, minutes from meetings on January 31, 1978; April 25, 1978;
and October 31, 1985.
6. The basic data for each institution were registrar lists of courses taught,
with accompanying information on instructors and enrollments. These lists
were complemented by faculty lists with ranks. For two institutions, informa-
tion on full-time-equivalent status also was used; for another, "census forms"
also were used. These forms were distributed to faculty each semester and280 NOTES TO PAGES 188-220
asked for verification of data on teaching assignments compiled by the regis-
trar. They were a means of obtaining additional information on shared
teaching, advising, and other duties.
7. In 1991/92, these four departments had an average of 25 regular fac-
ulty and slightly more than 100 graduate students.
8. According to administrative records, 41 of the 48 pre-major advisors
in 1976/77 were regular-rank faculty, compared with 51 of the 122 in
1991/92—a decline from 85 to 42 percent.
9. The growth in graduate enrollment counts both master's and doctoral
students. The inclusion of master's students, plus the lag between matricula-
tion and dissertation writing would explain why the number of supervisions
would not necessarily have grown by 87 percent.
10. Two trends in graduate education, noted by Bowen and Rudenstine
(1992), namely increased time-to-degree and higher attrition rates, could
explain the relative constancy in dissertation advising in the face of growth
in total graduate enrollments.
11. The regressions are given in appendix Table 7A.3 of this chapter.
12. For example, Public Policy Studies 114, The Politics of the Policy Pro-
cess, also might be listed separately as Political Science 114, but with the
same title. Thirty-five undergraduates might be enrolled in the course un-
der the Public Policy number, and another 10 might be enrolled in it as a
Political Science course. The total class size would, of course, be 45.
13. In several cases at Harvard, data from course catalogs and discussions
with administrators revealed that actual contact hours occasionally differed
from the number of contact hours recorded in official records. In such cases
actual hours were used.
14. Harvard's course catalog provides the names of all of the professors
participating in workshops. These workshops were treated as team-taught
classes, following the methodology noted in Appendix 7.2.
15. At Duke, all the courses described as independent study-type were
three hours. At Carleton, students can sign up for one to six credit hours of
independent study-type courses, with six considered a full course; therefore,
a faculty member's load of such courses for a term was calculated as the total
number of credits for independent study-type divided by six.
16. TOTAL is the total enrollment in the class. It is the sum of under-
graduate enrollment (UNDER), graduate enrollment (GRAD) and other stu-
dents (OTHER).
17. For the present study, these were calculated for regular (tenured and
tenure-track) faculty only.
18. In equation (1), substitute GRAD, for UNDERj and sum over all m
meetings of the graduate courses to perform this calculation.
Chapter 8
1. Boyer (1987, p. 145).
2. For the purpose of these calculations related to the size and instruc-
tors of classes, both instructors who would become assistant professorsNOTES TO PAGES 220-239 281
after they had earned their doctoral degree and emeritus faculty who had
been tenured professors were counted as regular tenure-track faculty. By
contrast, emeritus faculty were not included in the calculations of teach-
ing loads.
3. The weighted averages are (300 x 30)/300 in the first case and (90 x
10 + 210 x 210)/300 in the second. In practice, the weights are not neces-
sarily the same as class size (as they are in this example). The calculations
presented in the chapter were made separately for graduate and under-
graduate students in the universities. In the calculation for undergraduates,
for example, the number of undergraduates enrolled in each course of a
department is the weight, whereas the total class size includes undergradu-
ates as well as graduate students and other students enrolled in the course
through some other department (for cross-listed courses).
4. Noted in chapter 2. See Boyer (1987, p. 149).
5. In the same way that average class size is sensitive to the distribution of
classes by size, it also can be affected by a single large course. This effect can
be seen by comparing the two years' of data for the humanities department.
A large lecture class that was offered in 1986/87 was not offered in 1991/92;
this class accounts for most of the very significant difference in the depart-
ment's enrollments between the two years.
6. For statements to this effect, see, for example, Bennett (1986) or Massy
(1990).
7. Bowen and Rudenstine (1992, pp. 234—47), citing English, history, and
political science as illustrations, argue that the number of subfields in var-
ious disciplines has increased. They note the growing importance of inter-
disciplinary work, non-Western and other international perspectives, and
the application of approaches from one discipline to other disciplines as
factors in the growth of subfields. They note this effect on overall curricular
structure: "[T]here has obviously been some loss of articulated coherence in
the formal curriculum, some measurable loss of structure and control in
program definition and management, and an increased sense of uncertainty
about where to draw sensible boundary lines . . ." (p. 235).
8. If the catalog listed staff or gave no list of faculty, the assumption was
made that complete turnover of available faculty had not occurred.
9. One public critique that gained attention was an address by Price
(1993).
10. Clearly, a full investigation of this issue would require a careful
analysis that is well beyond the scope of this study. One suggestive piece
of information that may be relevant is the trend at Duke in the use of
final examinations in courses. Any instructor who does not plan to give a
final examination is asked to submit a form to the registrar listing any
such courses. The ratio of forms to the total number of courses, an im-
perfect measure of the proportion of courses in which no examinations
were given, increased from 0.121 in 1978/79 to 0.155 in 1991/92. Al-
though this trend obviously is open to more than one interpretation, it is
one concrete measure of a teaching technique for which comparable data
over time exist.282 NOTES TO PAGES 247-257
Chapter 9
1. Provost, Stanford University, quoted in Susan Chira, "How Stanford,
Wealthy and Wise, Is Cutting Costs to Stay that Way," New York Times, July 8,
1990, p. 1.
2. Duke Provost's Office. Part of this growth was offset by a decline in
nursing faculty.
3. The 32 colleges and universities belonging to the Consortium on Fi-
nancing Higher Education (COFHE) enrolled 122,000 undergraduates in
1993/94, which was 1.4 percent of the approximately 8.6 million full-time-
equivalent undergraduates reported for the 1990/91 year nationwide (U.S.
Department of Education 1992, p. 177, Table 165).
4. As noted in chapter 1, the growth of financial aid in private institutions
had the effect of moderating the growth of net tuition by about 0.6 percent
per year.
5. COFHE (1991, appendix A) and U.S. Department of Education (1994,
p. 312, Table 304). In a similar vein, Rothschild and White (1993) remark
on the similarity of tuition levels among private institutions of quite differ-
ent quality.
6. The changes in the unweighted average classroom teaching loads from
1976/77 to 1991/92, respectively, were: 3.74 to 3.79 in the departments cor-
responding to the natural science discipline, 5.22 to 3.74 in social science,
and 5.08 to 4.49 in the humanities. See chapter 7 for further discussion of
these measures.
7. The example of Kenneth Pye's retrenchment efforts at Duke could
serve as the exception that proves the rule. With much fanfare, university
committees deliberated over the possible elimination of five academic units.
In the end only two of the five were dropped—the nursing school and the
education department. These changes were significant, allowing a large in-
crease in arts and sciences undergraduate enrollments to take the place of
nursing students and the elimination of the university's largest PhD pro-
gram, that in education. Nevertheless, no tenured faculty member had to be
let go as a result of these changes, and, within a decade, the university was
offering graduate degrees in both nursing and education.
8. Some of these institutions offered, in addition to need-based aid, schol-
arships awarded strictly on the basis of merit. For a description of the uni-
form methodology that served as the basis for the financial aid awards made
by these institutions, see Clotfelter (1991).
9. Such cushioning is rarely complete, however, as self-help amounts typ-
ically are increased when tuition and fees are increased.
10. As noted in chapter 5, universities may exploit an employee's ties to a
locality to a certain extent, by offering less to continuing faculty than it
would to attract new hires.
11. See, for example, Rosovsky (1990, p. 71) and Rothschild and White
(1993) for discussions of the unwillingness of colleges and universities to
charge the theoretical equilibrium price.
12. The gap, based on the average salaries of all faculty in public andNOTES TO PAGES 257-262 283
private independent category I universities, was 10.0 percent in 1976/77 and
23.2 percent in 1991/92 (Academe, 1977 and 1992).
13. For a discussion of the role of education in the shifts in relative earn-
ings during the 1980s, see, for example, Murphy and Welch (1989).
14. See Rosovsky (1991) and "Bok's Outline of Right Role for Academy,"
New York Times, September 7, 1984.
15. An apparent exception is Antioch's reengineering effort, which com-
bines a rearrangement of administrative functions and the introduction of
new teaching techniques. See Guskin (1995) for a description of this effort.
16. In using this phrase, Riesman (1980, p. 5) excluded the most selective
private research universities; similar ideas have been applied to those uni-
versities as well.
17. University of Chicago Directory, 1991/92; Peterson's Guide to Four-Year
Colleges 1993; and unpublished data from the University of Chicago.
18. Comparing research and undergraduate teaching to the lions and ze-
bras on the Serengeti Plain, Coleman summarized his argument for separa-
tion: "[L]ions eat the zebras, and the research or consulting time eats the
teaching time" (1973, p. 381). Recently, Shapiro (1992) has questioned
whether such a separation ought not be instituted.